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RECENT DECISIONS

Hitherto, the New York courts had not extended the rule of
single publication so as to apply it to books, but had restricted its
application to newspapers and magazines. The decision in the present case so extends the rule and sweeps aside the reluctance shown
by the courts in the past to erase the distinction which existed between magazines and newspapers on the one hand, and books on the
other, in their treatment of the subject matter of libel actions. The
logic underlying this former distinction is that newspapers and
periodicals are generally discarded soon after their publication and
are seldom read thereafter, so that the damage likely to be suffered
therefrom is negligible. Books, however, are not designed to be read
merely during the period immediately following their first publication.
Some books retain their popularity for many years, so that one containing libelous statements would continue to damage the person so
libeled as long as copies are sold. This reasoning, however persuasive, when followed seems to defeat the clear purpose of the statute
of limitations, which is to outlaw stale claims and eliminate multiplicity of litigation. As a result of such reasoning, a book which had
been published twenty years ago might become the basis of a libel
action today, if perchance the publisher permitted a single copy to
be sold to the public. On the other hand, the extended single publication rule gives to the statute of limitations the effect which the
legislature seems to have intended.9
As a result of this decision, the present state of the law in New
York is that a libel is reiterated only when an independent act,
equivalent to a new publication in the trade sense, is committed.
The mere continued dissemination of copies of the defamatory matter
originally published is not a reiteration of the libel.
G. T. M.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-PROX MATE CAUSE-WHEN IT BECOMES

A QUESTION OF LAw FOR THE CouRT.-Plaintiff, an elderly woman,
emerged from a coffee shop through a revolving door opening upon
a small vestibule. The floor of the vestibule slopes almost imperceptibly toward the sidewalk where it meets a stepdown of about six
inches. After emerging from the revolving door and before stepping
upon the sidewalk, the plaintiff fell and broke her hip. The floor
was not slippery, nor did it contain any foreign substance which
might have caused her fall. The court directed a verdict for the
defendant because the plaintiff failed to show that the condition of
9 Chase Securities Corp'n v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 89 L. ed. 1628
(1945)., Here the court said that the purposes of the statute of limitation
are "to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from
being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost."
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the floor was the proximate .cause of her fall. On appeal, plaintiff
contended that the giving of a peremptory instruction, based on a
failure to show proximate cause, constituted reversible error. Held,
judgment affirmed. Determination of proximate cause of accident
ordinarily rests with jury, but where reasonable men can reach only
one logical determination of such questions from facts in evidence,
directed verdict is proper. Routzahn v. Brown Hotel, 307 Ky. 548,
211 S.W. 2d 848 (1948).
In negligence actions the rule is frequently reiterated that the
proximate cause of an injury must ordinarily be determined as a
question of fact by the jury in view of the circumstances attending
the injury.1 Proximate cause may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, if substantial. 2 But it is obvious that whether it will be a
question for the jury will depend on the circumstances of each case.
Thus, where the facts of the particular case are controverted or of
such character that different minds might reasonably draw different
conclusions therefrom, a question of fact is presented properly determinable by the jury.3 As the questions of negligence on the part
of the defendant in an action for personal injuries is one of fact for
the jury to determine under all the circumstances of the case and
under proper instructions from the court, so also is the question
whether there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff which was
the proximate cause of the injury.4 But where the facts are undisputed and are susceptible of only one inference, the question is
one of law for the court and the court should withdraw the question
from the jury. 5 Whether only one inference may be drawn necessarily must rest ultimately with the court. 6 Likewise, it is stated
that it is for the court to determine whether or not the evidence supports any reasonable inference of a causal relation between an act
of negligence and the injury complained of, in whole or in part; 7
and the court must reach its conclusion by determining whether the
evidence reasonably justifies the submission to the jury of the question whether defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in producing plaintiff's injuries." Where the evidence connecting defendant's negligence with plaintiff's injuries rests purely on speculation
or conjecture, it is a question of law for the court and no case for
1 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931) ; Maloney v.
Kaplan, 233 N. Y. 426, 135 N. E. 838 (1922); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Jamestown Mut. Life Ins. Co., 242 App. Div. 420, 275 N. Y. Supp. 47 (4th
Dep't 1934).
2 Paine v. Gamble Stores, 202 Minn. 462, 279 N. W. 257 (1938).
3 Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536, 51 N. E. 1 (1898).
45 United States Exp. Co. v. Kraft, 161 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 3d 1908).
Beiser v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 152 Ky. 522, 153 S. W. 742
(1913); Hoffman v. King, 160 N. Y. 618, 55 N. E. 401 (1899).
6 0'Malley v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 283, 2 P. 2d 1063 (1931).
7Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929).
8 See note 7 supra.
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the jury is presented.9 While, ordinarily, the answers to these questions would naturally fall within the province of the jury, and when
made in their verdict, would be regarded as binding, yet where the
facts are fairly incontrovertible, the question of proximate cause is
for the court.' 0 In this regard, the question of proximate cause is
not different from the question of negligence, or contributory negligence, in all of which, when the facts are conceded or found, the
question is one of law." The province of the jury is to find the
facts, but once being found or conceded, it
is the duty of the court to
2
declare the law applicable to such facts.'
Therefore, in the present case, since the plaintiff failed to -show
a causal connection between the injury and the condition of the vestibule, the only remaining conclusion was that the accident was caused
by plaintiff's own misstep and in such a case it is proper to take the
question out of the hands of the jury and direct a verdict for the
defendant.
J. J. L.
TREASURE-TRovE

-

LOST PROPERTY

-

MERGER OF TREASURE-

TROVE INTO LOST PROPERTY.-The defendants were members of a
church committee which had collected several bundles of rags. These
rags were parcelled out to hired women to weave into rugs. The
plaintiff was one of the women hired for this purpose, and in the
bundle allocated to her she found $2,100 in $10 and $20 bills. Plaintiff turned this money over to the defendants and advertised in the
local newspaper in an attempt to find the true owner. The money
was never claimed and the plaintiff requested the defendants to return it to her. Upon the defendant's refusal this action was brought
for the restoration of the money. The defendants counterclaimed
alleging that the plaintiff had forfeited her rights to the money by
failing to comply with a statute I that set up certain requirements 2
9 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Toops, 281 U. S. 351, 74 L. ed. 896 (1930) ;
Kalinowski v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, 242 App. Div. 43, 272 N Y. S. 759
(4th Dep't 1934).
10 Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 400 (C. C. A. 8th

1894).

Traylen v. Citraro, 112 Cal. App. 172, 297 Pac. 649 (1931).
12Johnson v. Wofford Oil Co., 42 Ga. App. 647, 157 S. E. 349 (1933).
' The Wisconsin statute provides: "If any person shall find any money
or goods of the value of three dollars or more and if the owner shall be unknown, such person shall, within five days after finding money give notice
1

thereof in writing to the town clerk ...

."

Wis. STAT. § 170.07 (1945).

2The statute also provided a penalty for non-compliance: "If any finder
of lost money or goods of the value of three dollars or upward shall neglect
to give notice of same and otherwise to comply with the provisions of this
chapter he shall be liable for the full value of such money or goods, one-half
to use of town the other half to person who shall sue for the same ....
Wis. STAT. § 170.07 (1945).

